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ABSTRACT
Using three alternative models that incorporate the behavior of both credit constrained and
unconstrained ﬁrms in a theoretically consistent manner, this paper presents evidence on the
eﬀects of economic liberalization of 1991 on aggregate private investment in India. Two robust
conclusions emerge from the estimation of the investment function by ARDL approach. First,
the response of private investment with respect to the relative cost of capital has increased at least
ﬁve times after the dismantling of the ‘License Raj’. Second, the evidence implies a signiﬁcant
improvement in the technological eﬃciency of the ﬁrms during the post-liberalization period. In
contrast, no robust conclusion can be drawn about the severity of the credit constraint faced by
the private sector following the liberalization.
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Investment and capital accumulation have traditionally been accorded a prime place
in the development literature. The evidence from the vast literature on growth empirics shows
investment in capital goods as one of the most robust determinants of cross-country growth (see,
Levine and Renelt, 1992, Durlauf and Quah, 1999).1 Over the last couple of decades, economic
liberalization and deregulation policies have been widely adopted by developing countries that
assign a central role to the private sector. The emphasis on the private sector as the engine of
economic growth and development has brought the focus on the behavior of private investment in
developing countries (see, for example, Fielding (1999) on South Africa and Guncavdi, Bleaney
and Mckay (1998) on Turkey). After decades of lackluster performance under the all pervasive
interventionist policy regime espoused after independence (the so-called ‘License Raj’), India
embarked on a major economic liberalization program in 1991, triggered by a severe balance of
payments crisis. The objective of this paper is to assess the eﬀects of liberalization on aggregate
private investment in India. We focus on two related issues: the eﬀects of liberalization on the
responsiveness of private investment to changes in relative cost of capital (response in the choice
of technique) and on the credit constraint faced by the private sector. 2
A major focus of the liberalization policies in India has been to dismantle the complex web of
controls that severely constrained the emergence and operation of the private entrepreneurs.3 The
import competition and competition from FDI unleashed by the external sector liberalization have
also increased the pressure on the domestic entrepreneurs. The liberalization measures are thus
expected to enable (due to deregulation and decontrol) and induce (due to increased competition)
the private entrepreneurs to be more responsive to the price signals both in the output and input
markets, and thus help improve eﬃciency in resource use. A primary objective of this paper
is to assess to what extent this ´ a priori expectation about improved price response is actually
1For a summary of the ﬁndings in the literature see table 2 in the survey by Durlauf and Quah (1999). Of
the nine studies reported in the survey that include investment or investment ratio as one of the determinants of
growth, only one study reports a negative but insigniﬁcant eﬀect, while the rest of the studies report a positive
eﬀect of investment on growth which is statistically signiﬁcant in seven of the cases.
2These questions have recently been analyzed in the context of ﬁnancial liberalization in Turkey by Guncavdi,
Bleaney, and Mckay (1998).
3The licensing regime established under Industries Development and Regulation Act (IDRA) in 1951 coupled
with import restrictions controlled the private sector decisions at every stage, from entry into an industry to capacity
expansion, to choice of technology, even output mix and import content. (For details, see Ahluwalia, Isher, 1985).
1borne out by data, focusing on the choice of technique of the ﬁrms. While the deregulation
and dismantling of License Raj are expected to improve the price responsiveness in general, and
in choice of technique in particular, the eﬀects on credit constraint are not unambiguous, on ´ a
priori grounds. On the one hand, liberalization might increase the availability of investment
funds through higher savings mobilization, foreign capital inﬂows (both FDI and portfolio), and
possibly a reduced demand from the public sector, a tight rein on the domestic credit creation
for macroeconomic stability can reduce the availability of credit. Also, a better disciplined
and cautious (prudent) ﬁnancial sector may lead to a hardening of the budget constraints for
individual ﬁrms (possibly the “sick enterprises”) and thus reduce the net credit ﬂow to the private
sector (the so-called excess liquidity in the banking sector). From this perspective, liberalization
might in fact make the credit constraint faced by the private sector tighter. Liberalization is
also likely to spur technological upgrading, due to the competitive pressure and learning and
technological externalities from FDIs, for example. Such technological change can be modelled
as an autonomous shift in the aggregate investment function, i.e., as a shift in the intercept of
the investment function.
Although there is a large literature on the time series estimation of aggregate private invest-
ment in developing countries, the empirical modeling has been constrained by the absence of a
tractable model of investment under credit constraint. The empirical literature has used diﬀer-
ent variables to capture the eﬀects of a binding credit constraint, including net credit to private
sector both in level and as a share of GDP (for a sample of the variables used, see Rama (1993)).4
The theoretical literature on modeling investment behavior under credit constraint has oﬀered
two alternative ways of specifying the investment function for empirical estimation. An explicit
investment function can be derived, under some restrictions on functional forms, from the closed
form solution of a ﬁrm’s optimization problem (see Chatelain (2000) for a closed form solution).
A more widely utilized empirical speciﬁcation of the investment function relies on the parameter-
ization of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the credit constraint in the Euler equation for
a constrained ﬁrm’s optimization problem (for a survey, see Hubbard (1998)). On a priori the-
oretical and empirical grounds, none of the speciﬁcations can be argued to dominate the others,
4The recent contributions using ﬁrm level data are generally based on more sound theoretical basis. See for
example, Fielding (2000) and Gelos and Werner (2002).
2and thus sensitivity of the parameter estimates should be tested using alternative speciﬁcations.
In order to ensure robustness of parameter estimates, we estimated the three speciﬁcations of
the investment function: the ﬁrst one is derived from the closed form solution (termed as ‘Total
Cash Flow Speciﬁcation’) and the other two are alternative parameterizations of the Lagrange
multiplier. Utilizing the results derived by Chatelain (2000), a theoretically consistent parameter-
ization of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the binding credit constraint is formulated in
terms of the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the variables determining the investment of both the constrained
and unconstrained ﬁrms (termed as ‘Chatelain Speciﬁcation’). A parsimonious parameterization
of the Lagrange multiplier in terms of the ratio of total investible funds 5 to real GDP (termed
as ‘Cash Flow Ratio Speciﬁcation’) is also employed for the empirical estimation. These three
speciﬁcations of aggregate investment function are used to analyze the eﬀects of economic liber-
alization on aggregate private investment in India, using time series data for the period 1952-53
to 1998-99.
Apart from a binding credit constraint, the other salient issues for modelling private invest-
ment in developing countries include (possible) complementarity between private investment and
public capital and the eﬀects of uncertainty on private investment. We implement a model of
private investment behavior that incorporates the triple issues of credit constraint, complemen-
tarity between public and private investment, and uncertainty. Thus the inference on the eﬀects
of liberalization on private investment is likely to be less susceptible to the problems of omitted
variables and misspeciﬁcation of the investment function.
The most interesting result from the econometric analysis based on the ARDL approach (a
la Pesaran and Shin, 1999) to the estimation of the investment function is that economic liber-
alization has dramatically increased the price response of private investment with respect to the
relative cost of capital (at least 4.5 times higher in the post-liberalization period). The elasticity
of aggregate private investment with respect to the relative cost of capital is estimated to be
approximately ¡1 in the post liberalization period. The post-liberalization period, according to
estimates of this paper, has also witnessed a substantial improvement in the technical eﬃciency
of the Indian ﬁrms. The estimates based on diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the investment function,
5Total investible funds equals retained earnings plus change in credit deﬂated by the price of capital
3however, lead to conﬂicting conclusions about the extent of the credit constraint faced by the pri-
vate sector following the deregulation and liberalization.6 These main conclusions are extremely
robust surviving across diﬀerent sample periods (1953-99, 1955-99, 1960-99). The evidence also
indicates that uncertainty has a negative inﬂuence on aggregate private investment. The stock
of public infrastructure (paved road, rail road, electricity generation capacity, and number of
telephone connections) seems to have a crowding in eﬀect, but it is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The ﬁrst section presents a discussion of the
theoretical and empirical issues in modelling of aggregate private investment function. The next
section, arranged in a number of subsections, is devoted to the analysis of the empirical results.
The paper ends with a summary of the empirical ﬁndings and their policy implications for India.
Section 1: Modelling Aggregate Private Investment: Theoretical and Em-
pirical Issues
The standard neoclassical model of investment behavior is based on the optimal input choice
decision of a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm facing no credit constraint.7 However, at any given time,
in any given economy, a certain proportion of ﬁrms will be credit constrained in the sense that
the credit available falls short of the amount required for acquiring the optimal capital stock.
The credit constraint may be due to government imposed restrictions (like directed credit that
discriminates against certain sectors), or problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in the
credit markets arising from asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In a theoretically
consistent speciﬁcation of the aggregate investment, we need to account for the existence of these
two types of ﬁrms, credit constrained and unconstrained.
An unconstrained ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt given the input and output prices, and the production
function. Let Q = F(K;L;G) be the production function where Q is output produced, K and
L are capital and labor inputs respectively, and G stands for the stock of public infrastructure
(henceforth called public capital stock). It is assumed that the production function is concave
6The results are somewhat diﬀerent from those found by Guncavdi et. al. (1998) for Turkey, where they do not
ﬁnd any evidence of a change in price response, but ﬁnd a signiﬁcant reduction in credit constraint.
7In strict theoretical sense, the objective is to maximize the present value of the ﬁrm. However, the present
value maximization is equivalent to proﬁt maximization at each point in time when the appropriate cost of capital
is used (see, Sargent, 1987, P.80).
4in the private inputs. The complementarity between public and private capital implies that
FKG(:) > 0 and FKGG(:) < 0, i.e., the marginal product of private capital is a positive but
declining function of the stock of public capital available in the economy.8 Denoting the user
cost of capital and wage rate by r and w respectively, the implicit form of optimal capital stock







In steady state the optimal investment is given by I¤ = ±K¤ where ± is the depreciation rate.








where the subscript uc to I¤ denotes unconstrained ﬁrms.
For the ﬁrms facing a binding credit constraint the standard price and output variables are
not likely to be important in the investment function. Theoretical literature has identiﬁed two
alternative ways of modeling investment decision under credit constraint for empirical estimation.
First, the investment function of a ﬁrm facing binding credit constraint can be derived, given
some restrictions on functional forms, from the closed form solution of the ﬁrm’s optimization
problem (Chatelain, 2000). Alternatively, the investment function of a constrained ﬁrm can be
speciﬁed by parameterizing the Lagrange multiplier associated with the binding credit constraint.
Indeed, parameterization of the Lagrange multiplier has been utilized widely for the estimation
of the investment function using ﬁrm level panel data (Schiantarelli, 1996 for a survey). However,
as noted before, both of the approaches are subject to some caveats. To guard against the
sensitivity of parameter estimates and to ensure the robustness of our results regarding the impact
8The use of public capital as an argument in the production function to study the complementarity between
private and public investment was pioneered by Aschauer (1989).
9Although it is standard to assume a log-linear functional form, there is no clear justiﬁcation for it. For a
log-linear functional form to be valid, both the production and the demand functions need to be of Cobb-Douglas
form. Also note that we are using a relative price variable instead of separate price variables r and w. This is
done for two reasons. First, it reduces the number of parameters to be estimated and also minimizes the problem
of potential collinearity problem among the price variables. Second, the relative cost of capital seems to be the
appropriate variable given our focus on the eﬀects of liberalization on the choice of technique, i.e., the optimal
capital-labor ratio.
10A similar approach is followed by Guncavdi et. al. (1998).
5of liberalization on private investment, we estimate three diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the investment
function.
According to the closed form solution of a constrained ﬁrm’s optimization problem derived in
Chatelain (2000), the investment of a credit constrained ﬁrm is a function of the change in credit
from the banking sector and a measure of internal funds available to the ﬁrm, where both the
variables are deﬂated by the price of capital.11 The investment function for the credit constrained
ﬁrm can be written as:12
I¤
c;t =








where ¿ is the tax rate, B is credit to the private sector, Pk the price of capital goods, the
subscripts t;(t¡1) denote time periods and subscript c in I¤
c;t stands for constrained ﬁrms. Observe
that the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of the above equation is essentially the retained proﬁt of
the ﬁrm expressed in units of capital goods. As is clear from equation (3), the right hand side can
be collapsed into a single measure of the availability of investment funds from both internal and
external sources expressed in units of capital goods which we denote as Ht. Although this gives
us a theoretically consistent speciﬁcation for the investment behavior of the credit constrained
ﬁrms, its empirical application often becomes diﬃcult because of the ‘near identity’ problem.
The problem of “near identity” arises because the actual investment undertaken by even an
unconstrained ﬁrm may be, as a matter of accounting identity, equal to the sum of internal and
external funds.13 This implies that when an aggregate measure of investible funds is used in
the private investment function, the estimating equation may behave almost like an accounting
identity, as the availability of investment funds alone accounts for a large share of the variations
in private investment. This may render the other variables of interest like income (aggregate
demand) and relative cost of capital statistically insigniﬁcant.
11Observe that even when the change in credit or measures of internal funds have been used in the literature,
they are NOT deﬂated by the price of capital.
12This is essentially equation (17) in Chatelain (op cit) where both sides of the equation have been multiplied
by Ki;t¡1. This speciﬁcation is derived by using ﬁrst order Taylor series expansion and under the assumption of
negligible adjustment costs.
13The accounting identity relating aggregate private investment and total investible funds of the private sector
is, however, not exact due to the fact that some of the credit usually goes to ﬁnance working capital, hence it is
called “Near Identity”.
6For the estimation of the parameters of the investment function, diﬀerent researchers have used
diﬀerent indicators of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial status to parameterize the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the credit constraint. There is a large empirical literature using panel data where the ﬁrms
are split into separate groups based on some indicator of the likelihood of a ﬁrm being credit
constrained, for example, cash ﬂow or internal net worth (for a survey, see Hubbard (1998)). In
the literature on time series estimation of private investment functions, especially in the context
of developing countries, the net credit to the private sector advanced by the banking sector has
widely been used as an indicator of the degree of credit constraint. In the absence of clear
theoretical and empirical guidance, some researchers have used the level of credit as an indicator
of degree of credit constraint, while others have used the ratio of credit to GDP, or change in credit
(see Rama (1993)). Chatelain (2000) shows that a theoretically consistent parameterization of
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the binding credit constraint can be formulated in terms
of the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the variables determining the level of investment of both the constrained
and unconstrained ﬁrms. This means that an array of variables including change in retained
earnings, second diﬀerence of credit to the private sector, change in income, changes in input
prices are needed to parameterize the Lagrange multiplier. However, the inclusion of such a
large number of variables in the regression often leads to the problems of severe multicollinearity
and over-parameterization of the investment function.14 In order to tackle the multicollinearity
problem, we estimated the ﬁrst principal component (Mt) of the variables suggested by Chatelain
(2000) approach to the parameterization of the Lagrange multiplier.15 The investment function






Note that the investment by a constrained ﬁrm is a positive function of the index of ﬁnance
14In fact, in case of India, the model can not be estimated because of the singularity of data matrix due to
near-perfect collinearity when using the parameterization suggested in Chatelain (2000).
15The list of variables used for the estimation of principal components include change in retained earnings, second
diﬀerence of credit to the private sector, inverse of change in income, changes in input prices, inverse of changes in
stock of public capital, changes in black market exchange premia (an indicator of uncertainty). Note that we used
the inverse of change in income and of change in infrastructure. The reason is that these two variables aﬀect the
excess demand for credit positively while the other three variables aﬀect it negatively.
7constraint, Mt. The intuition is that the excess demand for credit is a negative function of
Mt, because each individual component of Mt relates negatively to the excess demand, ceteris
paribus. For example, consider the inverse of change in GDP. A positive change in GDP, ceteris
paribus, implies a stronger investment demand, and thus a higher excess demand for credit. So the
inverse of change in GDP relates negatively to the excess demand in the credit market. Since the
virtual16(or ‘equilibrium’) cost of capital consistent with the observed aggregate demand for credit
is a positive function of the excess demand, and the investment demand is a negative function of
the virtual cost of capital, we get a positive relationship between constrained investment and Mt.
A second parameterization of the Lagrange multiplier which is both intuitive and parsimonious
can be formulated in terms of the ratio of total investible funds (retained earnings plus change in
credit, both deﬂated by the price of capital) to real GDP (Zt ´ Ht
Qt): The rationale for this ‘Cash
Flow Ratio’ parameterization is that the excess demand for credit by the private sector is, ceteris
paribus, a negative function of the total available investible funds (Ht) and a positive function
of aggregate demand, proxied by GDP (Qt) and thus is a negative function of Zt: By exactly
the same logic as in the case of Mt, this speciﬁcation implies a positive relationship between






The advantage of this ‘Cash Flow Ratio’ speciﬁcation is that it avoids both the near identity
and multicollinearity problems and also relates more closely to the available estimates from time
series studies which used net private credit as an indicator of credit constraint.
Denoting Ωt as a vector of variables determining the investment by constrained ﬁrms and
assuming linear speciﬁcations for the investment functions of both the constrained and uncon-
16In the sense of Neary and Roberts (1980).
8strained ﬁrms, the aggregate investment function can be speciﬁed as follows:
I¤
t = ¸I¤
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+ ¯3Gt + 'Ωt (6)
where
³0 ´ ¸˜ ¯0 (7)
and ¸ and (1 ¡ ¸) are the proportions of unconstrained and constrained ﬁrms in the economy
respectively. The variable determining investment by credit constrained ﬁrms, Ωt;is assumed to
have three diﬀerent speciﬁcations (Ht;Ψ(Mt);or Γ(Zt)). The vector ˜ ¯ and ˜ ' in equation (6)
denote the (deep) parameters of the aggregate investment function.17 Note that the treatment of
³0, ¯ and ' as parameters constant across the sample period depends on the validity of the implicit
assumption that the proportions of constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms remain relatively stable
over the entire sample period. However, the hypothesis that liberalization might have resulted
in a signiﬁcant relaxation (or tightening) of credit constraint faced by the private entrepreneurs
implies that the value of (1 ¡ ¸) will be signiﬁcantly smaller (or higher) in post liberalization
period. Such compositional changes are allowed for in the empirical implementation of the model
by using appropriate slope and intercept dummies. Also, observe that, strictly interpreted, the
model derived in equation (6) allows for changes in price response (with respect to the relative
cost of capital r
w) only through a change in the proportion of unconstrained ﬁrms in the economy.
However, such an interpretation will be too restrictive, especially in the context of India where
the main impetus to an improved price response is likely to come from the freedom of investment
decisions (in the choice of both input proportions and technology) after the demise of License
Raj. This can be modelled as access to an expanded technology set, to be captured by a
17In the above formulation, the credit constraint is assumed to be binding for a subset of ﬁrms in the economy even
in the long run. We believe, this is consistent with the experience of developed countries like USA characterized
by complete freedom of private entrepreneurial activity and a well developed ﬁnancial and capital market; there is
overwhelming evidence of a subset of ﬁrms being credit rationed due to moral hazard and adverse selection (See
Hubbard (1998)).
9change in the production parameters ˜ ¯; after economic liberalization. 18 As noted earlier, the
technological upgrading can also take the form of a shift in the intercept of investment function
³0. However, given the formulation in equation (6), it is, in general, not possible to disentangle
the eﬀects of changes in proportions of constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms from the eﬀects of a
pure technological shift.
Equation (6) gives us the basic speciﬁcation for aggregate private investment. However, we
need to augment the speciﬁcation to incorporate the implications of uncertainty for private invest-
ment behavior. The theoretical analysis of the eﬀects of uncertainty on investment, however, does
not yield any unambiguous prediction. On the one hand, the option value of waiting for arrival of
new information before committing to irreversible investment implies that the actual investment
will be less than the level predicted by simple neoclassical model (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). How-
ever, as pointed out by Abel and Eeberley (1996), there are both a call option (limited liability
to expand capital stock) and a put option (limited liability to contract capital stock) involved
in the irreversible investment decision, and ´ a priori, the net eﬀect is ambiguous. Since there
is no unambiguous theoretical prediction regarding the investment uncertainty relationship, it is
ultimately an empirical issue. In the context of developing countries, much recent eﬀort has gone
into understanding the eﬀects of uncertainty on private investment (for example, Rodrik (1991),
Aizenman and Marion (1993), Bleaney and Greenaway (2001)). We use black market exchange
rate premium as a proxy for uncertainty regarding returns to domestic investment. In the pres-
ence of uncertainty about the future stream of income generated by an irreversible investment in
the real sector of the domestic economy, foreign exchange holding (which is essentially perfectly
reversible) can become an attractive portfolio choice. Thus the demand for foreign exchange
in the black market (and hence the black market premium) responds positively to uncertainty
about domestic economy (see Van Wijnbergen, 1985 and Rodrik, 1991). Also, observe that black
market premium is a portmanteau statistic for uncertainty about domestic investment covering
uncertainties emanating from price and exchange rate ﬂuctuations, from lack of government policy
credibility and also from insecurity regarding the claim to property rights due to predation by
government or private Maﬁa.
18The constraints on capacity expansion, input and output mix and technology import were tantamount to
assuming that only a subset of the production set was eﬀectively available to the Indian private entrepreneurs.
10We use the logarithm of the ﬁrst principal component of four types of infrastructure (length of
paved road, length of rail track, electricity generation capacity, and number of telephone connec-
tions) as an index of stock of public infrastructure.19 Assuming homogeneous speciﬁcations for
the functions Ψ(Mt) = ¾Mt and Γ(Zt) = ½Zt, the ﬁnal speciﬁcation of the aggregate investment
function for three alternative models can be written as follows:
(1)I¤
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+ˇ '(D ¤ Ht) + µ1Jt + Àt (Total Cash Flow Speciﬁcation) (8)
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+ˇ ± (D ¤ Zt) + µ1Jt + Àt (Cash Flow Ratio Speciﬁcation) (10)
where Jt is black market exchange rate premium and D is the dummy for liberalization taking
one for the years 1991-1992 to 1998-1999 and zero otherwise, µ = '¾; ± = '½ and Àt is the error
term. In terms of equations (8), (9) and (10), a higher price response after liberalization implies
that ˇ ¯2 < 0 and a relaxed credit constraint implies that ˇ '; ˇ µ; ˇ ± < 0. Thus equations (8); (9) and
(10) form the basis of our empirical analysis.
Section 2: Empirical Analysis
In the empirical analysis we employ ARDL approach due to Pesaran and Shin (1999) for
estimation of the long run investment function. An important advantage of ARDL approach to
the estimation of a cointegrating vector is that it corrects for endogeneity of the explanatory
variables. In the aggregate investment model developed above, the ﬁnance constraint variable
Zt and Ht may be (at least partly) endogeneous given the fact that, for the unconstrained ﬁrms,
the observed amount of investment funds will be determined by their demand function.20 The
other nice feature of the ARDL approach is that it obviates the need for determining the order
19Logarithm of index of stock public infrastructure capital is taken to allow for possible non-linearity (decreasing
returns) in the relationship between private investment and public capital, as posited in the theoretical model.
20Of course, if most of the ﬁrms are credit constrained, then the potential endogeneity is negligible.
11of integration of the individual data series, and thus can avoid the uncertainties involved in the
unit root pretesting (see Maddala and Kim, 1998, for a discussion on the problems associated
with unit root pretesting). Also, there is evidence that the ARDL estimator has desirable small
sample properties (see, for example, Caporale and Pittis (1999) and Pesaran and Shin (1999)).
Since the ARDL approach to the estimation of a long run relationship (cointegrating vector)
and related bounds tests for the existence of a cointegrating relationship do not require any unit
root pre-testing, we start with a brief discussion of the bounds tests (Pesaran, Shin and Smith
(2001)). The evidence clearly shows that there is no problem of autocorrelation in any of the
possible alternative speciﬁcations of the deterministic part, and we perform the bounds tests for
all diﬀerent speciﬁcations except for the unrestricted trend case. Since a quadratic trend seems
implausible in the data, we exclude the case of an unrestricted trend as argued by Pesaran et. al.
(2000). The results on the bounds ‘F’ tests for the existence of a cointegrating relationship are
reported in appendix table A1. The results clearly show the existence of a long run relationship
among the variables of the investment model.21 The null hypothesis of no long run relationship
(no cointegration) is rejected at 1 percent signiﬁcance level across all the diﬀerent speciﬁcations
of the deterministic part, with the exception of two cases where the null is rejected at 5 percent
level (they are: (i) the unrestricted intercept with no trend for Cash Flow Ratio model, and (ii)
the unrestricted intercept with restricted trend for Total Cash Flow model, both at lag order 3).
Estimation of the Long Run Investment Function
Table (1) presents the results of the estimation of equations (8), (9) and (10) using ARDL
method for the sample period (1953-99). To save space, we present the results from the ARDL
speciﬁcations chosen by the Schwartz Bayesian information criterion only.22 The residuals from
the ARDL models selected by the SBC are well behaved. In particular, the results of F test for
autocorrelation show that the null of no autocorrelation can not be rejected at 10 percent for all
the diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
21We do not test for the exact number of long run relations, as the ARDL approach (or other single equation
methods like FMOLS estimator of Phillips and Hansen and the DOLS estimator of Stock and Watson) gives eﬃcient
estimate of a cointegrating vector even when there are multiple long run relations if there are no cross equation
restrictions (Caporale and Pittis (1999). See also Phillips (1991) ).
22One important advantage of using SBC rather than AIC is that it usually picks up a lower lag order which
conserves degrees of freedom.
12The ﬁrst striking thing to notice is that diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the investment functions
provide conﬂicting evidence regarding the extent of credit constraint, especially for the post-
liberalization period. In all three speciﬁcations of the investment function, the credit constraint
variable has consistently positive coeﬃcient indicating the existence of a binding credit constraint.
However, according to the speciﬁcations based on the parameterization of the Lagrange multiplier
[‘Cash Flow Ratio Speciﬁcation’ (column 2 in table 1) and ‘Chatelain Speciﬁcation’ (column
3)], credit constraint has not been statistically important during the pre-liberalization period
(P-value of 0.78 and 0.23 respectively) . The speciﬁcation based on the closed form solution
(‘Total Cash Flow Speciﬁcation’ in column 4), in contrast, suggests a statistically signiﬁcant
credit constraint during the pre-liberalization period (P-value= 0:02). Similar conﬂicting evidence
emerges from these three speciﬁcations regarding the eﬀect of liberalization on credit constraint
faced by the ﬁrms. The slope dummy for credit constraint is statistically signiﬁcant in all three
speciﬁcations with P values of 0:001 (Cash Flow Ratio), 0:002 (Chatelain), and 0:00 (Total Cash
Flow). However, the sign of the coeﬃcient of the slope dummy for credit constraint is positive
according to the Chatelain speciﬁcation and negative according to the Cash Flow Ratio and
Total Cash Flow speciﬁcations. The latter two speciﬁcations deﬁned on the basis of cash ﬂow
indeed suggest a complete relaxation of credit constraint during the post liberalization period.23
In contrast, the Chatelain speciﬁcation represented by the ﬁrst principal component of the ﬁrst
diﬀerences of the relevant variables indicates a signiﬁcant tightening of the credit constraint during
the post liberalization period. Thus the evidence does not allow us to reach any unambiguous
conclusion regarding the eﬀect of liberalization on credit constraint in the case of India. As already
noted in the preceding section, all three speciﬁcations of the investment function estimated in table
1 are theoretically consistent, yet they produce conﬂicting evidence. This highlights the need for
more detailed empirical investigation as well as the pitfalls in relying on the results from any
single speciﬁcation. A clear lesson is that one needs to be careful about ensuring the robustness
of results regarding the eﬀect of a credit constraint by using diﬀerent theoretically consistent
speciﬁcations.
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE (1) HERE]
23As evident from Table 1 column 2 and 4, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient of slope dummy is larger than or
equal to that of the coeﬃcient of credit constraint variable itself.
13The evidence in favor of a desirable eﬀect of liberalization on price response, in contrast, is
very strong. The slope dummy for the relative cost of capital is statistically highly signiﬁcant with
a P value of 0:00 across all three speciﬁcations of the investment function. The coeﬃcient of the
slope dummy is also numerically large in magnitude [¡1:41 (Cash Flow Ratio), ¡0:85 (Chatelain),
¡1:60 (Total Cash Flow)]. In contrast, the relative cost of capital itself ( r
w) has a much weaker
eﬀect: the coeﬃcient is numerically small (¡0:31 (Cash Flow Ratio), ¡0:14 (Chatelain), ¡0:15
(Total Cash Flow)) with P-values equal to 0:001 (Cash Flow Ratio), 0:11 (Chatelain) and 0:08
(Total Cash Flow) respectively. The evidence thus suggest the existence of a very weak price
response in the choice of technique before the economic liberalization in 1991-1992. This is not
at all surprising given the pervasiveness of controls on the private investment in India under the
‘License Raj’. The estimates imply a dramatic increase in the price response after liberalization.
For example, the estimates for the Cash Flow Ratio speciﬁcation imply that the strength of the
response of aggregate private investment with respect to the relative cost of capital has increased
approximately by ﬁve times after the dismantling of the control system over private sector. The
estimates for the other speciﬁcations are even larger [six times (Chatelain) and eleven times (Total
Cash Flow)]. This is a remarkable testimony in favor of the agility of the private entrepreneurs
in face of changing relative cost of capital. Also, observe that this price response can not be
attributed completely to an increase in the proportion of unconstrained ﬁrms in the economy;
the price response has increased by six times even in the speciﬁcation (Chatelain) which indicates
an increase in the proportion of constrained ﬁrms during the post liberalization period. This
implies that the ﬁrms have responded vigorously to the new-found freedom of business decision
making not only through substitutions between capital and labor, but also by upgrading the
technology.
The results reported in table 1 also provide strong evidence in favor of a signiﬁcant technologi-
cal shift in the private sector production function after the liberalization of 1991-92. The intercept
dummy has a positive coeﬃcient and is statistically highly signiﬁcant with a P-value of 0:00 across
all three speciﬁcations of the investment function. As noted in equation (7), a signiﬁcant upward
shift in the intercept dummy can result from a pure technological shift in the production function
or from an increase in the number of unconstrained ﬁrms or from a combination of both. None of
14the speciﬁcations estimated in table 1 allow us to isolate the extent of shift in intercept term due to
the technological upgrading from that due to a change in the number of unconstrained ﬁrms, but
they help to determine the direction of these shifts. We notice in table 1 that the estimates from
the Chatelain speciﬁcation imply an increase in the number of constrained ﬁrms during the post
liberalization period. Even in this speciﬁcation, the intercept dummy has a positive coeﬃcient
though its magnitude is smaller compared with the estimates from other two speciﬁcations. Note
also that the intercept dummy is also statistically highly signiﬁcant [t-value= 4:58]. Thus one can
safely argue that the evidence clearly indicates a positive shift in the private sector production
function in the post liberalization period. This ﬁnding is consistent with the available evidence
from micro studies using ﬁrm level data which reported signiﬁcant improvement in technological
eﬃciency of the ﬁrms during the post liberalization period (see, for example, Forbes, 2001).
As to the other determinants of aggregate private investment, all three speciﬁcations tell a
consistent story. The level of GDP has a numerically large and statistically signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect on private investment suggesting a strong accelerator mechanism at work. Uncertainty as
captured by black market exchange rate premium has a negative eﬀect across all three speciﬁca-
tions. The coeﬃcient of the index of public infrastructure capital has a consistent positive sign
across all speciﬁcations indicating possible complementarity with private investment. However,
the coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant even at 10 percent.
As a further test of the robustness of our results, we estimated all three speciﬁcations of the
investment function for three diﬀerent sample periods (1953-99 reported in table 1, 1955-99 and
1960-99). The Estimates for 1955-99 are similar to that for 1953-99 and are omitted for brevity.
The estimates for 1960-99 are reported in table 2. It is interesting and reassuring to note that our
central result regarding the dramatic increase in the price response remains nearly unchanged.
In the speciﬁcations based on the parameterization of the Lagrange multiplier (Cash Flow Ratio
and Chatelain), the estimates for coeﬃcients of the relative cost of capital ( r
w) and its slope
dummy are approximately same as those reported in table 1 for the sample period 1953-99. The
estimates for 1960-99 imply an increase in price response during the post liberalization period
ranging from 4.6 to 6 times. However, the estimates for the Total Cash Flow speciﬁcation imply a
much larger increase in price response (14 times) compared with that implied by the estimates for
151953-99 sample (11 times). Similar to the results for the1953-99 sample, the estimates of diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of the investment function for 1960-99 provide conﬂicting evidence regarding the
eﬀect of liberalization on credit constraint. The evidence from the 1960-99 sample on the eﬀects
of liberalization on the technological upgrading is consistent with that from 1953-99 sample.
The estimates of the coeﬃcient of the intercept dummy across diﬀerent speciﬁcations imply a
signiﬁcant upward shift in the intercept term indicating improved technological eﬃciency during
the post liberalization period. Thus our main results regarding the impact of liberalization remain
equally valid for the 1960-99 sample. A comparison of the estimates in table 1 and 2 shows that
the estimates of the coeﬃcient vector for 1953-99 and 1960-99 diﬀer substantially only in the case
of Total Cash Flow speciﬁcation. For instance, the coeﬃcient of GDP becomes much smaller (0:07
for 1960-99 sample compared with 0:11 for 1953-99 sample) and statistically insigniﬁcant (t-value
= 1:58 compared with t = 3:24 for 1953-99). The insigniﬁcance of GDP is not surprising as the
Total Cash Flow speciﬁcation is subject to the ‘near identity’ problem mentioned earlier.
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
An important concern, especially from the policy perspective, is the potential instability of
the estimated coeﬃcients of the private investment function. However, the results, especially
regarding the eﬀects of liberalization on price response and technical eﬃciency, are remarkably
consistent across diﬀerent sample periods, and thus provide us with strong indications that the
estimated parameters are not fragile. As additional checks, we implemented four diﬀerent sets of
stability tests: CUSUM, CUSUMSQ, Rolling Regression, and Recursive Estimation. We present
the detailed results from only CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests. The Figure 1 presents the CUSUM
and CUSUMSQ tests estimated for the sample period 1953-1999 for all three speciﬁcations. The
results show that there is no instability problem with any of the speciﬁcations. The results of the
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests for the other sample periods are similar and thus omitted. 24 The
results on the stability of each individual coeﬃcients from the Recursive Estimation and Rolling
Regression corroborate the evidence from the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests reported here and
24There is some indication of instability for the Total Cash Flow Speciﬁcation from the CUSUMSQ test for the
1960-1999 sample
16are not reported for the sake of brevity. 25
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Elasticity Estimates
To get a feel of the relative eﬀects of diﬀerent factors inﬂuencing aggregate private investment
in India, table (3) presents estimates of elasticities calculated at mean. The estimates clearly
show that the elasticity of aggregate private investment with respect to the relative cost of capital
( r
w) is very high in the post-liberalization period. Even if one focuses on the most conservative
estimate (Chatelain speciﬁcation), a 1 percent increase in the relative cost of capital decreases
investment by approximately 0:91 percent. This evidence cautions us about the potentially strong
negative eﬀects of a signiﬁcant increase in the lending interest rate charged by the banking sector.
Since the user cost of capital incorporates the eﬀects of the price of capital along with the interest
rate, this also implies that a rise in the price of capital, for example, due to a large devaluation
of rupee, can have signiﬁcant adverse eﬀect on aggregate investment in India.26
The negative eﬀect of uncertainty as represented by black market exchange rate premium is,
however, not large in magnitude; a one percent increase in the black market exchange premium
lowers private investment only by 0:07 percent, even if one uses the highest estimate. This
muted eﬀect of uncertainty is not totally unexpected, as the eﬀect is not unambiguous on ´ a
priori grounds also.27 We take a cautious approach to the estimates of elasticities with respect
to other policy relevant variables presented in table 3 either because, contrary to the widely
held prior expectation, the variable in question has statistically insigniﬁcant impact (e.g. public
infrastructure) or the sign of the coeﬃcient changes across speciﬁcations (e.g. credit constraint).
Thus it would be premature to draw any ﬁrm conclusions about the extent of their eﬀects on
private investment in India without further research.
25The results of Rolling Regressions and Recursive Estimation for each individual coeﬃcient in all three models
are available from the authors.
26An increase in the price of capital will have especially depressing eﬀect on the current investment if the price
of capital is expected to come down subsequently. This is so because in this case the expectation of a capital loss
reinforces the disincentive created by the higher current price of capital.
27The black market exchange premium also captures, at least in part, the eﬀects of international trade distortions
on domestic private investment. The evidence thus shows that there is a negative, albeit small, eﬀect of trade
distortions on aggregate private investment in India.
17[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Conclusions
Using three alternative models of aggregate private investment that incorporate the behavior
of both credit constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms in a theoretically consistent manner, this
paper presents evidence on the eﬀects of the economic liberalization of 1991-92 on the aggregate
private investment in India. The empirical results, using ARDL approach to the estimation
of a cointegrating vector, show that the response of private investment with respect to relative
cost of capital has improved dramatically following the liberalization. While the response to a
change in relative cost of capital was very weak in pre-liberalization period, it has increased by
at least 5 times after liberalization, the most conservative elasticity estimate being ¡0:91 for the
post-liberalization period. This implies that an increase in the lending interest rate or price of
capital is likely to have signiﬁcant adverse impact on private investment and thus on economic
growth. The evidence also indicates a signiﬁcant improvement in technological eﬃciency of the
ﬁrms during post-liberalization period. These evidence attest to the remarkable agility of the
Indian ﬁrms in taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the dismantling of the License
Raj after 1991-92.
The negative eﬀect of uncertainty as measured by the black market exchange rate premium,
however, seems to be numerically small, although statistically signiﬁcant. While the estimates
imply a complementary relationship between the stock of public infrastructure capital and private
investment in India, the relationship is rather tenuous and statistically insigniﬁcant. Estimates
from diﬀerent theoretically consistent speciﬁcations of the investment function provide conﬂicting
evidence on the severity of credit constraint during pre- and post- liberalization periods. Thus
no robust conclusion can be drawn about the impact of liberalization on the extent of credit
constraint faced by the ﬁrms. Our empirical analysis thus shows that the conclusion about the
extent of credit constraint may be sensitive to the speciﬁcation of the investment model and
highlights the pitfalls in relying on any given speciﬁcation. The results bring into focus the need
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Data Sources and Variable Deﬁnitions
The data used in this paper were taken from Economic Survey (Government of India), Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (IMF), Statistical Yearbook (UN), Key Indicators of Developing Asian
and Paciﬁc Countries (ADB), Chandhok (1990), Canning (1998), Mallick and Kuma (1995), CIA
Database, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Paciﬁc (UN), and Singh, V.B. (1963).
I = Aggregate private investment in local currency (Rupee) deﬂated by the price of capital
(gross domestic capital formation deﬂator).
Q = Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Rupee deﬂated by GDP deﬂator.
r/w = Ratio of real user cost of capital and real wage in the manufacturing sector. The
nominal user cost of capital and nominal wage are deﬂated by GDP deﬂator. The nominal user
cost of capital at time t is deﬁned as:
Price of capital(t) [lending rate (t) + 0.04 f1+lending rate(t)g -expected Capital Gain (t)].
With the assumption of perfect foresight, expected capital gain (t) is calculated as [Price of
capital (t+1)-Price of capital (t)]/Price of capital (t)]. The main results of the paper are robust
to alternative assumptions of expectations formation including static expectations and a ﬁxed
parameter AR model based estimate of expected capital gains. Also, the results are not sensitive
with respect to the alternative assumption regarding depreciation rate.
G = log of Public capital stock represented by the ﬁrst principal component of KW of electricity
generating capacity, Rail route length in KM, Number of telephones, and Paved road length in
KM.
H(t)=(Retained earnings (t) +Change in credit (t)) / Price of Capital (t).
Z= H (t) / Q (t).
M=ﬁrst principal component of of ﬁrst diﬀerences in total investible fund (retained earning
plus change in credit both deﬂated by price of capital), inverse of change in real GDP, change
19in relative cost of capital, inverse of change in public infrastructure and change in black market
exchange premia.
J = Black market exchange rate premium.
D = Dummy variable. D is 1 for the post liberalization period (1992-1999) and zero otherwise.
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22Table 1: Estimated Long Run Coefficients using the ARDL Approach  
ARDL Model selected by Schwartz Baysian Information Criterion  
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Note: t-ratios are reported in first parentheses under the coefficient and p-values are in square bracket.  
a: Cash flow ratio is equal to the ratio of total investible fund (retained earnings plus change in credit, both 
deflated by the price of capital) to real GDP. 
b: Chatelain specification:1
st Principal component of first differences in total investible fund (retained 
earning plus change in credit both deflated by price of capital), inverse of change in real GDP, change in 
relative cost of capital, inverse of change in public infrastructure and change in black market exchange 
premia. 
c: Cash flow is equal to total investible fund ((retained earnings plus change in credit, both deflated by the 






 Table 2: Estimated Long Run Coefficients using the ARDL Approach 
ARDL Model selected by Schwartz Baysian Information Criterion  
Sample : 1960-99 
 
  Parameterization of Lagrange Multiplier 
for credit constraint 
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Note: t-ratios are reported in first parentheses under the coefficient and p-values are in square bracket.  
a: Cash flow ratio is equal to the ratio of total investible fund (retained earnings plus change in credit, both 
deflated by the price of capital) to real GDP. 
b: Chatelain specification:1
st Principal component of first differences in total investible fund (retained 
earning plus change in credit both deflated by price of capital), inverse of change in real GDP, change in 
relative cost of capital, inverse of change in public infrastructure and change in black market exchange 
premia. 
c:  Cash flow is equal to total investible fund (retained earnings plus change in credit, both deflated by the 








                                 
ELASTICITY   ESTIMATES 
 
 
  Parameterization of Lagrange Multiplier 
for credit constraint 
Closed form Solution 
for credit constraint 











GDP 1.35  1.32  1.08  1.05  0.76  0.48 
Relative Cost of 
Capital (Pre-
reform) 
-0.28 -0.29 -0.13 -0.13  -0.14  -0.10 
Relative Cost of 
Capital (Post-
reform) 
-1.58 -1.60 -0.91 -0.91  -1.61  -1.60 
Credit Constraint 
(Pre-reform) 
0.07 0.05 0.003  0.001 0.52  0.89 
Credit Constraint 
(Post-reform) 




0.10 0.10 0.09 0.12  0.07  -0.06 
Black Market 
Exchange Premium 
-0.07 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04  -0.06  -0.06 
 
Note:  a: Cash flow ratio is equal to the ratio of total investible fund (retained earnings plus change in 
credit, both deflated by the price of capital) to real GDP. 
b: Chatelain specification:1
st Principal component of first differences in total investible fund (retained 
earning plus change in credit both deflated by price of capital), inverse of change in real GDP, change in 
relative cost of capital, inverse of change in public infrastructure and change in black market exchange 
premia. 
c:  Cash flow is equal to total investible fund (retained earnings plus change in credit, both deflated by the 
price of capital). 
 Figure 1: Cumulative Sum Tests 
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A. Cash flow Ratio Specification 
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B. Chatelain Specification 
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C. Total Cash Flow Specification 
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 Table A.1: BOUNDS TESTS FOR COINTEGRATION 
F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of an Investment Equation:1953-99 
Cash Flow Ratio 











1 13.4434  14.7076  12.8887  13.7098 
2 5.1843  4.5001  5.1011  4.4642 
3 5.0844  4.3337  4.9696  5.3639 
 
Chatelian Specification 











1 9.9046  8.5229  9.5586  8.2412 
2 4.9841  4.8677  5.4300  4.3805 
3 4.7756  4.3082  4.9125  4.6531 
 
Total Cash Flow 











1 14.2136  14.5459  16.0735  15.2135 
2 7.5150  7.7717  8.6218  7.9363 
3 6.8829  6.0985  6.7607  6.3062 
 
F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of an Investment Equation :1960-99  
Cash Flow Ratio 











1 10.4919  11.9967  13.7030  11.6793 
2 4.4346  4.6987  4.7387  4.3497 
3 4.4396  4.9856  4.2539
*  4.2436 
 
Chatelian Specification 











1 11.1851  9.7205  10.8003  9.4351 
2 6.1677  5.8254  6.4556  6.0629 
3 6.3508  4.0792  4.4019  8.3496 
 
Total Cash Flow 











1 11.4903  12.2919  13.6179  12.1475 
2 5.8337  6.8397  5.3842  5.4762 
3 4.8670  4.3789  4.6964  4.0200
* 
Note: The F statistics fall outside the upper bounds at 1 percent significance, except for the starred ones 
which are significant at 5 percent.  The critical bounds from Pesaran et. al. (2001) at 1 percent are 2.54-3.91 
(no intercept, no trend), 2.73-3.90 (restricted intercept), 2.96-4.26 (unrestricted intercept), 3.07-4.23 
(restricted trend). 